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Abstract 
 Cross-country growth regressions have in recent years become a major growth 
industry.  The most common purpose of this work has been to investigate the 
determinants of economic growth.  But it is also possible to use the existing growth data 
to determine the extent to which policy choices help or hinder growth.  This paper 
generates estimates of the net contribution of policy to growth for a wide variety of 
countries.  It also provides the ability to “see” in an almost photographic way what 
substantial economic reform looks like, to test whether countries have meaningfully 
reformed.  The findings also provide grist for speculation on the virtues of gradual versus 
dramatic, total economic reform. 
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 The problem of economic growth is perhaps one of the most fundamental in all of 
economics.  Thinking about why nations become (and, more compellingly, do not 
become) wealthy has occupied many of the greatest minds in the field at least since the 
days of Hume, Smith and Ricardo.  In much of the twentieth century, with the advent of 
modern neoclassical techniques, the thinking about development was dominated by the 
need to spur adequate investment.  The basic description of the problem took several 
forms technically, but whether seen as mobilizing adequate savings to achieve a target 
investment rate (Domar, 19461), of moving through a sequence of stages, the most critical 
of which is an investment “takeoff” (Rostow 1960), of adding enough capital stock to 
draw away surplus labor (Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1964), or of convergence via 
capital accumulation to a steady-state equilibrium (Solow, 1956), the key task was always 
explicitly or implicitly to accumulate physical capital.  This is an idea that is pregnant 
with implications, because it is not much of a leap from this characterization of the 
problem to a belief that a command authority, e.g. a government ministry or a multilateral 
aid organization, ought to be in charge of that mobilization. 
More recently, owing to the increase in the amount and quality of the available 
data, a substantial and rapidly growing empirical literature has emphasized human capital 
(Lucas, 1988, Romer, 1986).  The presence of both specific and general human capital is 
according to this literature critical although not necessarily sufficient to achieving 
economic growth.  In addition, the role of policy has in recent years commanded attention.  
                                                 
1.   Easterly (1999) argues that Harrod-Domar models became extraordinarily influential 
in policy circles despite the fact that Domar (1957) later argued that he did not intend his 
work to be used in development. 
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Policy has always been important, even in the models revolving around physical and 
human capital, but the focus of work such as Barro (1991) has been on the potential of 
policy to do harm.  In particular, he finds that government distortions, failure to maintain 
openness to foreign trade and investment, and excessive government spending (and, he 
speculates, the taxes needed to fund it) destroy growth.   
 But Barro’s work and the literature it has spawned focuses mostly on standard, 
ceteris paribus analysis.  Without question, this has been important, in that it has 
established what Yusuf and Stiglitz (2001) term a consensus up to a point about what 
sorts of policies promote growth.  But there has been little attempt to quantify the effects 
of policy in explaining the wealth and poverty of nations.  Countries that manage 
economic policy well (poorly) can promote (squelch) growth, but how much?  This paper 
attempts to answer that question.  Using standard growth regressions, it is able to make 
(necessarily speculative) estimates of how much countries have in the last several 
decades suffered and benefited from their government policies.  The results are not only 
of theoretical interest, in that they suggest the magnitude of the income created or 
destroyed by policy, but raise issues of importance in terms of promoting economic 
reform.  There is controversy over the virtues of radical versus gradual reform in 
dysfunctional economies.  The findings allow some inferences about the virtues of the 
two approaches.  In addition, if political constraints are assumed to rule out radical, 
“shock therapy” reform, the results are of interest in suggesting which reforms can 
provide the most immediate benefit for struggling nations.  Section 1 lays out the extent 
of development failure, Section 2 presents the basic empirical approach, Section 3 
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extends the analysis by controlling for different effects at different levels of development, 
and Section 4 lays out some implications for improved economic policy. 
 
1.  The nature of the problem 
 The best place to begin the discussion is perhaps to note how difficult the struggle 
to modernize has been for a disappointingly large fraction of the world’s poorest 
countries.  Table 1 depicts two measures of the absence of progress over the last thirty-
five years.  The first list consists of those countries whose per capita incomes were in the 
bottom half of the by-country distribution in 1960 but had by 1995 moved past the global 
median in 1985 – US$2463.2   The right-hand portion lists the 32 nations that have 
achieved at least two-percent average annual growth in per capita income between 1960 
and 1995.  Note that this latter standard is none too exacting – it means that the standard 
of living roughly doubles in 35 years.  In light of the prevalence poverty throughout much 
of the world, the brevity of these lists has to be counted as a substantial failure.  Whether 
it is a failure of the advice rendered to poor countries or their failure to heed it is an open 
question, but the widespread criticism in recent years in development organizations such 
as the World Bank of decades of mistakes, combined with references to lost years and 
even lost decades in countries throughout the developing world, suggests the former.  A 
compelling question naturally arises: what does it take to get economic policy right? 
The stylized facts of the most prosperous economies are an extremely complex 
division of labor, the use of substantial amounts of machinery that enhances the marginal 
productivity of work, and a high endowment of human capital.  The latter variable is 
                                                 
2.  All dollar figures in the paper are expressed in 1985 prices.  
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greater both in absolute quantity and, by at least one measure, in quality as well in 
wealthier nations.  Table 2 lists the average capital stock per worker, the population’s 
average years of schooling and the student-teacher ratio in primary school for each third 
of the distribution of national per capita gross domestic product.  Workers in the richest 
countries have the most capital to work with and have the most and the highest-quality 
schooling.  While there is some controversy over whether high educational levels are an 
effect or a cause of prosperity (Bils and Klenow, 2000), it seems hard to imagine that a 
poorly educated society has brighter prospects than a well-educated one, other things 
equal.  As noted in the introduction, in the case of both types of capital, the theoretical 
basis for growth arising from accumulation of these factors is high.   
Indeed, another implication of the Romer (1986) school of thought is that the 
convergence prediction of the neoclassical model – that, due to a common production 
technology, nations should as they accumulate capital see their standards of living 
converge roughly to the production frontier – is false.  Wealthy nations with significant 
stocks of human capital and flows of research activity can generate ever-greater 
prosperity that allows them to further distance themselves from the vast bulk of nations 
not so characterized.  To make the leap from stagnation to modern, technologically 
sophisticated growth in this view may in fact be quite difficult.  Exhibit A in this 
argument is generally held to be the failure of the bulk of the world’ countries to 
converge as predicted.  Of the countries that were not developed at the end of World War 
II, only a handful – concentrated in East Asia and Europe with a few other bright spots in 
places like Mauritius and Chile – have managed to escape the poverty trap. 
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But it is possible that ordinary policy mistakes have been of such a magnitude that 
they explain a significant portion of the failure to converge.  Why would we expect a 
nation plagued by macroeconomic chaos, crippling rent-seeking and other problems of 
what I will call malgovernance to be converging toward anything but abject misery?  
Given that the advice handed out by economists differs from what it once was with 
respect to the balance between markets and planning, and that governments may be 
subject to incentives far removed from maximizing the growth of per capita income, there 
is no reason to suppose that countries are immune to long periods of bad economic policy.  
The extent of such activities is of course, an empirical question. 
 
2. The Basic Empirical Model 
 The analysis begins by noting that the standard approach in growth regressions 
has been to treat all countries the same regardless of their current standard of living.  The 
effect of a marginal increase in human capital or inflation is assumed to be the same for a 
country with a  per capita of $1000 as $10,000.  This is done by specifying growth as the 
dependent variable and the various state variables of the economy as independent 
variables.  But there may be diminishing returns to physical or human capital, and policy 
or the other state variables may affect countries differently depending on where they are 
in the global income distribution.  To capture the full effect for countries at different 
levels of income it will be necessary later to test for these effects.   
 The data for the regressions are the updated appendix to the widely used Barro-
Lee (1994) cross-country data sets.  The data contain national-level observations over 
five-year intervals dating from 1960 to 1995.  Empirically, the first task is to establish the 
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overall relation between economic growth and its theoretical determinants.  The approach 
is somewhat similar to that of Barro (2000), who takes the neoclassical growth model as 
his starting point and argues that at any moment in time an economy has potential as well 
as actual output.  While the similarity in terminology to traditional Keynesian analysis of 
the business cycle is obvious, the words mean something different here.  Potential output 
is defined by the available production technology as well as the choices that governments 
have made, for both good and ill, in economic policy and the country’s ability to engage 
in exchange with other countries.  A government that provides the most productive pure 
public goods, enforces property rights and controls externalities while avoiding 
distortions and avoiding the costly disincentives of excessive or inappropriate taxation 
will have a higher level of potential output, as will a country that can trade with other 
countries on favorable terms.  All of these things determine the economy’s steady-state 
output once the neoclassical capital-accumulation process has ended.  Actual output, on 
the other hand, is a function of the amount of physical and human capital an economy 
possesses relative to the Solow steady-state equilibrium.  Countries should over time 
converge to their potential output, and the speed at which they do so will depend on the 
rate of growth of capital. 
 With that framework in mind, the following equation is first estimated for the 
entire Barro-Lee sample: 
 
 GROWTH = a0 + a1 PCGDP + a2 INVGDP + a3 PREMIUM + a4 GCGDP +  
a5 TRADESHOCK + a6 OPENNESS + a7 HUMCAP + a8 INSTABILITY + 
 a9 INFLATION + a10 DEMOCRACY    (1) 
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 GROWTH is the five-year average growth rate of per capita gross domestic 
product.  INVGDP is the five-year average of investment as a percentage of GDP, and is 
a direct measure of the addition of capital stock.  The variables determining potential 
output are PREMIUM, GCGDP, TRADESHOCK, OPENNESS, INSTABILITY and 
INFLATION.  PREMIUM is a measure of the black-market premium charged to the 
country’s official exchange rate.  It is log(Black-market rate/official rate).  Barro (1991) 
argues that it is a proxy for the level of governmental distortions, e.g. subsidies, taxes, 
monopoly privileges, foreign-exchange and import restrictions, in the economy.  A 
greater number of such distortions is assumed to lower the economy’s potential output.  
GCGDP is government consumption spending other than on defense and education.  
TRADESHOCK is the growth rate of the country’s export prices minus that of its import 
prices.  OPENNESS is the measure of openness to foreign trade and investment used by 
Sachs and Warner (1995).   
Political choices, structures and events can also affect growth.  INSTABILITY is 
the Barro/Lee formulation of political instability during the period, defined as one-half 
times the combined number of assassinations and revolutions during the five-year 
interval.  DEMOCRACY is the Barro (2000) index of democracy, which ranges from 0 to 
1.  The effects of greater electoral competition on economic growth are not clear.  
Wittman (1989) argues that greater democracy amounts to more competitive political 
markets which, like more competitive product markets, ought to yield greater efficiency.  
But Cheung (1998) believes that democracy in poor countries is a recipe for disaster, in 
that it allows pressure groups to more easily mobilize to engage in predatory activities.  
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INFLATION is the average inflation rate during the five-year period.  Inflation might 
harm a country’s growth potential for all sorts of reasons: the noise it introduces into the 
price system, hindering its ability to effectively coordinate economic activity; the 
introduction of a distortionary tax on holding currency; the increased difficulty of long-
range forecasting and hence the introduction of a bias against long-term contracting; the 
transaction costs of inflation management; and a host of others.   A summary of these 
theoretical arguments can be found in Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995). 
The final variable is HUMCAP, a measure of the country’s human capital.  It is 
the country’s average schooling divided by its primary student-teacher ratio, with this 
figure then multiplied by life expectancy.  There is a significant modeling issue with 
respect to how to incorporate human capital into the analysis.  On the one hand, it can be 
seen as just another production factor, like physical capital and labor.  If so, the 
appropriate measure is the rate of change of human capital, analogous to investment as 
the rate of change of physical capital, either in the current period or lagged.  The 
alternative is more appropriate to the analysis of the literature descended from Romer 
(1986), in which human capital generates knowledge, which then becomes a public good 
raising productivity of other inputs throughout the economy.  In that case a higher level of 
human capital should generate more knowledge and hence faster growth.  Both 
estimation methods were tried.  With respect to the growth of human capital, both one-
period and two-period growth rates were used in an attempt to proxy for the rate of 
growth of the productive factor.  In none of the cases was this variable significant.  On 
the other hand, using the contemporaneous stock of human capital is sometimes 
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significant in ways detailed below.  Thus throughout the stock instead of the growth rate 
of HUMCAP is used. 
The results using OLS are presented in Table 2.3  All of the variables are 
statistically significant in the expected direction.  The negative sign on PREMIUM 
indicates that a greater level of distortions retards growth.  Interestingly, the sign on 
OPENNESS is independently significant.  If the static distortionary effects of trade 
restrictions are incorporated in PREMIUM, then some other effect is being captured by 
the significance of OPENNESS.  Some candidates, many of which have been emphasized 
in recent years in the international-trade literature, include economies of scale from 
exporting to wealthier and larger markets, learning by doing through foreign economic 
interaction, and the ability to tap foreign capital markets and advanced technology 
through foreign investment.  The simple measure of openness used here does not allow 
discrimination among these (not necessarily exclusive) hypotheses.  But in any case open 
economies seem to grow faster even for a given level of other distortions.  DEMOCRACY 
is not a significant predictor of growth. 
In addition, the change in a country’s relative export prices positively influences 
growth, as expected.  Both the addition to physical capital and the level of human capital 
positively influence it.  Political instability, which might disrupt the stability of property 
rights, negatively affects growth.  Government consumption, which has ambiguous 
effects on growth in theory, appears to negatively affect it in practice.  And consistent 
                                                 
3.  The data are in cross-sectional time-series form.  A generalized random-effects 
regression was conducted, and the results were almost indiscernible from those reported 
here.  
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with years of macroeconomic thinking, inflation is toxic to growth.  Finally, the 
neoclassical growth model finds support, as in the past, with the negative sign of PCGDP.  
After standardizing for other considerations, poorer countries grow faster.  Convergence 
begins with a period of rapid growth (other things equal), which slows down as the 
production frontier is approached, a result consistent with intuition about the once rapidly 
growing economies of northeast Asia. 
 
3. Differences by Per Capita Income 
To test whether the effects of changes in the state variables are the same for 
poorer and richer countries, interaction variables are used, where the interaction is with 
dummy variables representing, respectively, the top and bottom fifths of the total 
distribution over the 35-year sample of per capita GDP.  The geographic and temporal 
distribution of observations included in the regression is presented in Table 5.  The 
poorest fifth is unsurprisingly dominated by sub-Saharan African nations, while the 
richest fifth is dominated by nations in Europe.  The interaction variables INTER1PREM, 
INTER1GC, INTER1INFL, INTER1INST, INTER1INV, INTER1HC, and INTER1OPEN 
represent the interaction of being in the top fifth of per capita income with 
LOGPREMIUM, GCGDP, INFLATION, INSTABILITY, INVGDP, HUMCAP and 
OPENNESS respectively.  The INTER2 variables represent interaction with a presence in 
the bottom fifth of the distribution.  The results were also tested with dummy-variable 
interactions for the top and bottom third, respectively, and the results are similar.   
The results for the various models are broadly similar, with none of the interaction 
terms significant, with two exceptions.  For the poorest countries, INTER2PREM is 
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significant with a positive sign, suggesting that governmental distortions are less 
damaging to the poorest countries.  And INTER1INV has a negative sign, suggesting that 
the richest countries get less of a GDP payoff for a given level of physical capital and the 
other independent variables, which suggests diminishing returns to capital.  Other than 
that, the basic model is quite resilient in explaining the sources of economic growth.  The 
two significant interaction terms will be incorporated in the calculation of policy-related 
losses below.  Table 6 lists the re-estimation of (1) incorporating these two interaction 
terms. 
 
4. Evaluating economic policy 
The regression results provide an opportunity to measure the effect of economic 
mismanagement, as well as economic misfortune.  Several of the variables – PREMIUM, 
GCGDP, and OPENNESS – are unequivocally results of conscious policy choices, and 
one more, INFLATION, is certainly arguably such a result.  One other, TOFTSHOCK, is 
a variable that is largely out of the hands of government officials, except insofar as the 
government can encourage a change in the country’s trade patterns.  It will be useful to 
contrast the effects of this relatively independent variable with those of the policy 
variables. 
The value in expectation of the loss imposed by a particular form of inefficiency 
is simply the regression coefficient times the value of that variable for that country.  
Table 6 lists the ten worst performers with respect to each of the policy variables over the 
period 1990-1995, expressed as annual growth in gross domestic product foregone.  The 
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final column lists the total sums of the losses incurred from mistaken policy.  The losses 
are expressed as deviations from the mean. 
The first thing to note is that the losses from bad government policy are hardly 
negligible for the poorest-performing countries, in excess of five percentage points per 
year for Zambia, which is the worst-governed country for the period 1990-1995.  The 
costs of bad government policy are substantial.  It is worth noting that the figures are 
defined for a given level of human capital and investment.  Those variables, particularly 
the latter, are subject to government policy choices as well, and the data do not lend 
themselves to analyzing why countries choose to build more or less human capital, or to 
court or punish investment.  But presumably malgovernance with respect to these factor-
accumulation variables would make the problem worse. 
The second finding of interest is that there does not seem to be one component 
that dominates in terms of contributing to poor growth performance.  Figure 1 contains 
the depiction of the components of losses from poor economic policy contained in Table 
7.  Inspection reveals that there is no overall dominant component; each of the 
components in some cases does significant damage.  In addition, no particular component 
of bad governance necessitates the others.  Table 8 is the correlation matrix for the four 
components of the four components listed in Table 7.  The top portion of the table is for 
the entire sample, and the bottom portion is for the subset containing all observations in 
which nations had negative per capita growth during a five-year period.  In neither case is 
the correlation overwhelming, with the possible exception of OPENNESS and PREMIUM.  
Many nations are not overwhelmed by many policy problems simultaneously.  This result 
can perhaps be interpreted as making the transition to more sound policy somewhat easier. 
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Another interesting exercise is to talk about the unluckiest countries, in the sense 
of having suffered because of adverse developments in their terms of trade.  The losses 
from terms of trade shocks during 1990-95 are contained in Table 9.  There is of course 
no reason why a country cannot be both unlucky and badly governed, and so Nigeria is 
on the lists both of countries that suffered from poor governance and from adverse 
international economic developments from 1990 to 1995.  Two other countries, Syria and 
Gabon, suffered unusually poor terms of trade shocks during this period as well as one 
component of bad governance. 
These experiments can also be carried out for the entire sample period.  Table 10 
depicts the same figures as in Table 7, only for the full 1960-1995 period.  It again 
reveals the extraordinary costs of malgovernance for many of the countries that have 
suffered from it.  Even a loss of one percentage point a year amounts, over thirty-five 
years, to a per capita gross domestic product that is forty percent lower.  Those pondering 
the mystery of why seemingly promising countries like Argentina (itself once one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world) and India have struggled so mightily in the postwar 
period have a promising explanation in poor government policies.   
To again assess who which countries have benefited from terms-of-trade 
adjustments presumably out of their control, Table 11 depicts the average annual gains or 
penalties to growth from adverse terms-of-trade developments from 1960-1995.  The 
most noteworthy finding is how small the losses other relative to those from bad policy.  
Each of the individual components of the costs of malgovernance has had more dramatic 
effects than terms of trade shocks, and there is not a single country that has lost more than 
three tenths of a percentage point of average annual per capita growth between 1960 and 
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1995.  This is a significant finding in light of the argument that one still frequently hears 
that developing countries are systematically handicapped by their dependence on 
commodities, which allegedly are subject to systematically adverse developments in 
relative prices.  In fact, the list of countries that have benefited most from changes in 
international relative prices over the full sample period is dominated by developing 
countries. 
As before, the correlation matrix for events associated with policy (i.e., between 
PREMIUM, INFLATION, GCGP and OPENNESS) is calculated, and presented in Table 
12.  Other than the relation between PREMIUM and INFLATION, there is no 
overwhelming sense in the full sample of coincidence among the various components.   
The lesson that emerges is compelling: bad policy is costly.  In that sense, the 
increasing emphasis, at least in their public statements, that multilateral organizations and 
OECD countries are placing on sound policy as a condition for substantially enhanced 
development assistance is undoubtedly a step forward form past practices.  Some 
evidence (Alesina and Weder, 2002) indicates that not only was sound policy not a 
condition in the past for substantial development assistance, there was even a negative 
correlation between corruption and aid, and conditioning aid on policy may be effective 
more as a payoff than as a further contribution to development, in that development 
assistance may contribute negatively to growth (Osborne, 2003). 
 
5.  Lessons for economic reform 
 The last ten to fifteen years have demonstrated that the process of economic 
reform is surprisingly complex.  It is true that the Washington Consensus, substantial 
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market reform as a condition for IMF and other multilateral assistance, has been 
substantially accepted among the most influential development economists, as well as 
many government officials in developing countries.  From Carlos Salinas in Mexico to 
the nominally Peronist Carlos Menem in Argentina to Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, the 
list of leaders who embraced market-based reforms, whether out of original conviction or 
conversion, is lengthy and until recently was growing.  However, acceptance by the 
public of such measures, particularly in Latin America, is another matter.  Recent election 
results in Venezuela, Ecuador and Brazil suggest public impatience with the inability of 
reform, or at least the appearance of reform, to quickly deliver increased prosperity.  In 
Argentina the timeline is somewhat different, in that there were several years of rapid 
growth followed by a spectacular collapse, but the public sentiment for expanding or 
even maintaining economic reform is quite possibly fading. 
 If good policy pays off (as the above evidence suggests), but not quickly enough 
given political constraints, this is a significant problem for those in charge of making 
policy.  Indeed, if one assumes that a government wants to enact the reform program that 
will be most effective, this amounts to maximizing economic growth over the long term 
against the constraint of political resistance.  But as we have seen different components 
of reform contribute to reform in different amounts.  Each component – inflation, 
distortions, openness, government spending – can be thought of as generating marginal 
benefits in the form of higher growth as well as marginal costs in the form of both 
political resistance and the political transaction costs of implementation.  To conquer 
hyperinflation will harm some constituencies, but probably not many – those who benefit 
from inflation management, perhaps, but few others.  Untangling the web of government 
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distortions, each of which benefits one or more constituencies in obvious ways while 
imposing costs on other disparate, poorly organized groups that may well be unknown to 
them, is arguably a far more difficult task.  The same logic holds for lower government 
spending.  Increasing openness is a more complex case, as each trade or investment 
barrier benefits some domestic constituency, but if most or all such barriers can be 
eliminated at a stroke the benefits may flow immediately and obviously to many groups 
as well.  The optimal path of reform clearly must take these considerations into account. 
Theory has a fair amount to say about which steps should be taken when.  There 
are two independent issues.  First, should reform even be gradual, or instead of the “big 
bang” type?  Only if gradual reform is recommended does sequencing even become an 
issue.  With respect to the first question, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) specifically model 
political resistance by sectors of the population, and find that one-shot reform is preferred 
when losers are substantial and who the winners and losers are is difficult to predict.  
Gradualism in such an environment invites mobilization by the losers and hence potential 
failure.  Dewatripont and Roland (1995) find that gradual reforms are generally more 
likely to survive politically, particularly if winners can be generated and politically 
cultivated in the early stages. 
 But such work is of course only helpful if the existence or absence of those 
conditions can be established before reform begins.  Given the difficulty of identifying 
such conditions, and then identifying the constituencies likely to support reform, the 
empirical relevance of such work is somewhat muted.  But other work specifically tackles 
the proper ordering of reform steps.  In general, it finds that macroeconomic stabilization, 
by which is meant control of budget deficits and inflation and the establishment of a more 
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realistic exchange rate, ought to come first along with trade liberalization.  Financial-
market liberalization should come later.  This literature is surveyed in (World 
Development, 1997) and Krueger (2000, “Second stage”). In any event, political 
opposition may compel a partial liberalization in the early stages, and when that is 
combined with the theoretical arguments in favor of gradualism the question arises, what 
first? 
 This amounts to asking, of the four measured components of malgovernance 
tackled here, which one would contribute the most good?  The analysis above suggests 
that there is no ironclad recipe for choosing among tackling inflation, government 
distortions, the closed nature of the economy and excessive government spending.  In 
different countries different problems do different amounts of damage.  Thus, each 
country must examine its own costs from malgovernance to see which policies exact the 
greatest costs in terms of foregone growth.  For example Zambia, the country with the 
greatest total losses during the 1990-1995 period in Table 7, lost .014896 points of 
growth (relative to the mean) to excessive spending, .016545 points to inflation, 0071508 
points to closure of the economy to foreign trade and investment, and .0142833 points to 
government distortions.  If one reform must be chosen, and assuming (perhaps heroically) 
no feedback effects to other costs, control of inflation would seem to be the most urgent 
task from the point of view of benefits.  (The political costs of implementing various 
types of reform are another matter.) 
 Some interesting results come from investigating the path of those countries that 
have actually engaged in the greatest amount of reform.  One way to do that is to examine 
the countries whose total losses from malgovernance have decreased by the greatest 
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amount between the 1960-1965 and 1990-1995 periods.  Table 13 lists the values for 
LOSSTOTAL for each five-year period between 1960 and 1995 for the ten nations with 
the greatest positive change in that variable between 1960-65 and 1990-95.  Among the 
nations listed are several exemplars for either dramatic economic reform or successful 
policy, which is an indication that the measurements of distortion and reform used in this 
paper are consistent with the general understanding of these concepts.  In particular, 
Indonesia can be seen to have begin dramatic reform after 1970, Korea in roughly 1965 
or 1970, Chile in the 1975-1980 period, Israel after 1985, Ireland after 1970, New 
Zealand after 1985 and Uganda after 1990.  In addition two countries, the Central African 
Republic and Tunisia, have reform patterns that are less sudden and will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
 The details of reform are somewhat different in various countries.  Figs. 2-11 
depict the contribution, positive or negative, of each policy component to growth relative 
to the mean.  In Indonesia, where the net contribution of policy changed by the greatest 
amount between 1960 and 1995, the most significant contributions were made by 
conquering inflation after 1970 and opening up to the world economy after 1975.  Korea 
made modest cuts in government distortions after 1965 and opening up the economy after 
1970.  Inflation was never a significant contributor to poor policy there.  After 1985, 
government consumption actually went from being a modest boost to growth to a modest 
negative.  This might be because as it became wealthier Korea underwent the well-known 
tendency of wealthier countries to expand the reach of government (Peltzman, 1980). 
 In Chile, interestingly, the obviously radical reforms after 1975 in fact at first 
simply returned the country to the status quo before the Allende government took power 
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in 1970.  But the reform was broad-based, with inflation, distortions and openness 
contributing far more substantially to growth after 1975 than before.  Only government 
consumption worsened its negative impact on growth.  In Israel, it was inflation and 
openness that were doing the most damage by 1985, and whose repair was the most 
dramatic change in policy.  As in Korea and Chile, government consumption rose after 
the dramatic reform period, and it is possible that this involved extending the social-
spending safety net to make reform more palatable, a possibility that has been suggested 
for Chile in particular (Valdés, 1995). 
 Ireland made dramatic improvements in openness after 1970, and steady but 
modest improvements in government consumption.  New Zealand’s post-1985 reform, so 
obvious in Fig. 9, again revolved mostly around opening the economy.   Openness is also 
important in Uganda after 1990, with OPENNESS changing from a small drain to a major 
boost to the economy.  Inflation is also a big part of the story there, changing from a 
major to a tiny drag on economic performance.  In the Philippines openness is again a 
major part of the reform after 1985, with a significant improvement in each subsequent 
five-year period.  There was major improvement in the cost of government distortions 
between 1985 and 1990, followed by a slight retrenchment in the next period. 
 Several implications emerge from this pattern.  First, openness is a part of each of 
the successful reform efforts.  While the imprecision of the measurement of OPENNESS 
merits caution as to the exact size of the effects from opening up in each case, it is clear, 
that if a reform is substantial it generally includes this step.  In most cases, opening up is 
in fact one of the first things that is done.  The same is true of inflation – if it is a 
significant problem, tackling it seems to be a necessary first step.  In each case where 
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reform took hold and inflation was a problem, its elimination occurred early in the 
process.  In one case, Indonesia, major reforms in openness occurred after inflation was 
conquered. 
 The importance of inflation conquest in successful reform is not surprising.  
Inflation is costly in a very visible way – all segments of the population are affected by it, 
it is not invisible to the average citizen in the way that government distortions or trade 
barriers might be, and many people are largely defenseless against it.  To slay the 
inflation dragon is to chalk up a substantial success in economic reform, which may give 
governments that achieve it the credibility to engage in further reforms.  
 The tackling of government distortions also reveals interesting problems.  In 
several countries (Indonesia and Israel) distortions appear to have been addressed after 
other problems – a sequential approach.  In the Central African Republic and Korea, it 
appears that distortions were never seriously addressed.  In one – Tunisia – they were 
addressed before other problems, but even in 1995 distortions were in that country 
relative to the global mean a drag on economic growth.  By the measure used, two 
countries – New Zealand and Ireland – had no distortions to tackle.  In only two countries 
– Chile and the Philippines – was a simultaneous solution to distortions and inflation 
and/or openness successfully achieved. 
That inflation-fighting is such a big part of successful reform is unsurprising.  In 
addition to the aforementioned immediate political benefits, there are a number of 
relatively simple remedies available on the shelf for purging inflation, especially 
hyperinflation.  Adopting significantly tighter monetary policies, more exotic hard-
currency systems such as the currency board, and in several Latin American countries 
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outright dollarization have all had significant success in curbing hyperinflation.  
Admittedly, in at least on case – Argentina – the currency-board option has been blamed 
for exacerbating if not outright causing the economic collapse in that country in late 2001 
and early 2002.  On the other hand, such systems have been argued to be successful in 
Lithuania, Estonia and Hong Kong, among other places.  The verdict on dollarization is 
still out – the preliminary evidence from Latin America is that they are overwhelmingly 
successful in slaying hyperinflation, but their long-term effects are unknown. 
The relatively low transaction costs of inflation fighting, combined with the 
payoffs in higher growth and the immediate political approval from same, surely explain 
why gradualist nations emphasize it in the early stages.  In addition, the relative rareness 
of distortion removal in the early stages of gradual reform provide some support for the 
framework sketched here of the growth and political benefits versus political- and 
transaction-costs framework.  This is buttressed by the relative unimportance in early 
stages of reform of lower government consumption spending.  In Indonesia, government 
spending declined in the period after other reforms, before rising again after 1985.  In 
Chile it actually expanded during the first five-year period, but eventually declined after 
1985.  Similar initial deteriorations occurred in Israel and Uganda, if reform is dated as 
beginning after 1985 and 1990 respectively in those countries.  In the Philippines 
government consumption does not appear to have been a part of the reform process at all, 
while in Tunisia, Ireland and New Zealand it was not a big part of the problem.  Only in 
the Central African Republic was government consumption tackled early in the reform 
process, and there the reform was quite gradual.  That government consumption is such a 
small part of these reforms is of interest in light of the emphasis it often receives in IMF 
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reform programs.  Of course, to be fair often the demands to slash government spending 
are not because spending per se is high but because deficits are huge.  However, absent 
chronic deficits of that sort, substantial cuts in spending may rank relatively low in terms 
of immediate importance in economic reform. 
 
Gradual vs. total 
 
 Is radical reform practical?  The feasibility of empirical analysis suffers from an 
inability to differentiate it from gradual reform in the data.  The analysis here does allow 
at least an attempt.  Reform must be defined by a change from policies that are hostile to 
those that are friendly to growth.  The calculated policy loss LOSSTOTAL can serve as a 
proxy for that variable.  I will define the scope of reform as any change in LOSSTOTAL 
from one five-year period to the next of at least 0.01, i.e. a change of at least one 
percentage point in the growth-friendliness of policies.  The list of countries who have 
engaged in it by that measure is found in Table 14.  There are three such changes between 
1965 and 1970 (Venezuela, Brazil and Taiwan), four between 1970 and 1975 (Indonesia, 
Egypt, Senegal and Korea) and between 1975 and 1980 (Chile, Cameroon, Indonesia and 
Sri Lanka), two between 1980 and 1985 (Chile and Mauritania), five between 1985 and 
1990 (Bolivia, Israel, Ghana, Costa Rica and the Central African Republic) and 14 
between 1990 and 1995 (Argentina, Poland, Uganda, Mexico, Venezuela, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Israel, Turkey, Ghana, Uruguay, Tunisia, Gambia and the Philippines).  That the 
measure is a useful proxy for the phenomenon is supported by the huge increase in such 
reforms in the 1990s, which is generally judged to be the time when the pressures of 
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globalization, the desires of multilateral agencies and ODA donor countries and the 
desires of the body politic (particularly in the former Soviet bloc) are generally held to 
have created a great deal of momentum for market-friendly policies. 
 It is possible to (roughly) distinguish between gradual reform and shock therapy 
by looking at the changes in the components of LOSSTOTAL.  In so doing, two questions 
present themselves: is each type of reform sustained, and does it generate higher 
economic growth?  Nine of the 17 reforms involved only two of the four components, 
while eight involved three or four.  First, it was worth noting that ten years out, in all 17 
cases the growth penalty was less than before reforms began, suggesting that in either 
case reform can hold.  But the average growth penalty in the modest-reform countries had 
improved by 1.29980 percentage points during this period, while in the more dramatically 
reformed economies it had improved by 3.25151 points.  Of course, the proof of the 
pudding is in growth, not the estimated growth penalty.  During the five-year period 
beginning ten years after the onset of reform, the gradual-reform countries by the above 
criteria grew an average of 3.00 percent per year, versus 2.42 percent in the five-year 
period prior to reform while the shock-therapy countries grew an average of 3.68 percent, 
versus prior growth of 2.86 percent.  Of course, the small number of observations in this 
respect make firm conclusions hazardous, but both methods do seem to provide some 
payouts down the road, with a modest edge to radical reform. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 If the findings are to be believed, policy matters – a lot.  The notion that a select 
group of nations might, because of their knowledge and technological infrastructure, leap 
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irretrievably beyond the ability of poorer nations to catch up at least to a first 
approximation is an appealing one in light of the results of fifty years or more of 
surprisingly difficult efforts to develop.  But the notion of an impassable barrier between 
rich nations growing ever more prosperous and a large group nations mired in hopeless 
poverty would, if true, argue against any nations ever advancing from poverty to 
prosperity.  That significant numbers of nations have made some progress, and that a few 
have completely made the transition from underdeveloped to developed is a sign that all 
is not lost.  The prime implication of the findings here is that good policy, however it is to 
be achieved, is effective in making substantial improvements to growth rates.  This 
appears to be true whether reform is gradual or sudden, although there does seem to be 
slight room in the data for preferring sudden reform.  In any case, the importance of 
sound policy ought to be elevated to a dominant level in the discussion of improving the 
lot of the world’s poor.
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Table 1 
Growth in the developing world, 1960-1995 
Below-median climbers   Most rapid growth 
 
Per capita Y 1960 1995   Annual per capita growth rate 
 
Seychelles 1253 4260   S. Korea 6.86 
Swaziland 1240 2629   Singapore 6.72 
Tunisia 1095 3160   Taiwan 6.29 
Indonesia 641 2499   Hong Kong 6.15 
Jordan  1158 3197   Malta  5.36 
S. Korea 898 9145   Thailand 4.81 
Sri Lanka 1253 2536   Malaysia 4.64 
Thailand 940 4869   Botswana 4.48 
      Portugal 4.31 
      Indonesia 3.96 
      Lesotho 3.76 
      China  3.75 
      Seychelles 3.56 
      Greece  3.51 
      Syria  3.19 
      Tunisia 3.07 
      Jordan  2.94 
      Barbados 2.80 
      Morocco 2.71 
      Turkey  2.60 
      Egypt  2.60 
      Cape Verde 2.57 
      Brazil  2.56 
      Mauritius 2.54 
      Pakistan 2.40 
      Colombia 2.32 
      Panama 2.30 
      Gabon  2.20 
      Swaziland 2.17 
      Mexico 2.13 
      Sri Lanka 2.03 
      Dom. Rep. 2.03 
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Table 2 
Physical and human capital, by national per capita income 
 
    Bottom third  Middle third  Top third 
Non-residential  1627.80  8408.68  30,289.23 
  capital stock,   (n = 10)  (n = 19)  (n = 31) 
  1990 
 
Average years   3.05   5.73   7.89 
  of schooling,   (n = 30)  (n = 33)  (n = 48) 
  1995 
 
Primary student-  44.03   28.55   21.41 
  teacher ratio,   (n = 30)  (n = 33)  (n = 48) 
  1995 
 
Sources: Penn World Tables 5.6 (physical capital), Barro and Lee (1994) (human capital) 
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Table 3 
 
OLS results, entire sample 
 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error 
 
CONSTANT  .0241222 .0067432 
 
PCGDP***  -6.48e-06 1.10e-06 
 
INVGDP***  .1110481 .0240248 
 
PREMIUM*  -.0018652 .0010576 
 
GCGDP***  -.1143939 .0252939 
 
TRADESHOCK*** .0832733 .0257677 
 
OPENNESS*** .0138895 .0040703 
 
HUMCAP**  1.98e-06 6.75e-07 
 
INSTABILITY* -.0141174 .007702 
 
INFLATION*** -.0281259 .0071934 
 
DEMOCRACY -.0004643 .0052111 
 
F: 17.98*** 
 
R2: 0.3493 
 
N: 346 
 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the ten-percent level. 
 
** denotes statistical significance at the one-percent level. 
 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 0.1-percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Geographical and temporal distribution of per capita income 
     
Poorest fifth (below $816.60) 
     
Middle Sub-Saharan     Eur./N. 
 S. Asia East       Africa     East Asia Latin Amer. Amer.  Total 
 
1960 1 0  4  1  1  0 7 
 
1965 1 0  8  1  0  0 10 
 
1970 1 0  7  1  0  0 9 
 
1975 0 0  8  0  0  0 8 
 
1980 0 0  8  0  0  0 8 
 
1985 0 0  13  0  0  0 13 
 
1990 0 0  7  0  0  0 7 
 
Total 3 0  55  3  1  0 62 
 
Top fifth (above 6807.2) 
 
Middle Sub-Saharan      
 S. Asia East       Africa     East Asia Latin Amer. Europe    Total 
 
1960 0 0  0  0  3 3 3 
 
1965 0 2  0  0  2 4 4 
 
1970 0 3  0  0  3 7 7 
 
1975 0 4  0  1  5 12 12 
 
1980 0 4  1  2  6 16 16 
 
1985 0 2  1  3  4 16 16 
 
1990 0 2  1  2  5 15 15 
 
Total 0 17  3  8  28 0 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Regression Results 
 
Top fifth 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
 
PREMIUM -.0013522* -.0013636* -.0012824* -.0012493* -.0015188* -.0013196* -.0012861* -.0012591* 
 
GCGDP  -.1095196*** -.1052964*** -.1119875*** -.1116001*** -.1047702*** -.1075777*** -.1102927*** -.1119689*** 
 
INFLATION -.0299949*** -.0304655*** -.0292873*** -.0299961*** -.0302654*** -.0308095*** -.030057*** -.029743*** 
 
INSTABILITY -.0140906* -.0138494* -.0143462* -.0138278* -.0142824* -.01408* -.0141127* -.0142784* 
 
INVGDP .0930784*** .0924124*** .0933907*** .0927042*** .0981478*** .0899006*** .0926308*** .0933675*** 
 
HUMCAP .00000139** .00000148** .00000154** .00000143** .00000139** .00000175** .00000142** .00000140** 
 
OPENNESS .015067*** .0149436*** .0147649*** .0151598*** .0144974*** .0148969*** .0153538*** .0149408*** 
 
TOFTSHOCK .0691863*** .069556*** .0699264*** .0692126*** .0609432*** .0695487*** .0689953*** .074587*** 
 
PCGDP  -.00000459*** -.00000445*** -.00000483*** -.00000483 -.00000400*** -.00000456*** -.00000470*** -.00000484*** 
 
CONSTANT .0237669*** .0229764*** .0243904*** .0246634*** ..0212466*** .0233844*** .0241665*** .024788*** 
 
INTER1PRE .0004215 -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
INTER1GC -  -.0705123 -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
INTER1INFL -  -  -.0178962 -  -  -  -  - 
 
INTER1INST -  -  -  -.0084581 -  -  -  - 
 
INTER1INV -  -  -  -  -.0392014* -  -  - 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Top fifth 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
 
INTER1HC -  -  -  -  -  -.00000551 -  - 
 
INTER1OPEN -  -  -  -  -    -.0018991 - 
 
INTER1TT -  -  -  -  -    -  -.0700875 
 
N  487  487  487  487  487  487  487  487 
 
R2  .3577  .3591  .3583  .3575  .3626  .3584  .3575  .3449 
 
F  26.51*** 26.67*** 26.58  26.48  27.08*** 26.59*** 26.49*** 26.59*** 
 
 
Bottom fifth 
 
PREMIUM -.0018659** -.0013168* -.0012426* -.0012801* -.0012559* -.0012423* -.0012323* -.0012224* 
 
GCGDP  -.1022232*** -.1057736*** -.1119918*** -.1111923*** -.1110792*** -.1096271*** -.1114181*** -.1121667*** 
 
INFLATION -.0296984*** -.0296478*** -.0300588*** -.0290463*** -.0298885*** -.0295879*** -.0297585*** -.0300572*** 
 
INSTABILITY -.0150719* -.0146726*** -.01414*  -.0131193* -.0142314* -.0147174* -.0143447* -.0142904* 
 
INVGGDP .0877031*** .0913523*** .0933768*** .0903788*** .0931822*** .0911466*** .0923011*** .093261*** 
 
HUMCAP .00000141** .00000140** .00000142** .00000138** .00000141** .00000141** .00000141** .00000144** 
 
OPENNESS .013868*** .0150124*** .0151217*** .0151371*** .0150959*** .0152334*** .0154135*** .0152491*** 
 
TOFTSHOCK .0684828*** .0690617*** .0693247*** .0680788** .069182*** .0697726*** .0696151*** .0782199*** 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
 
PCGDP  -.00000508*** -.00000487*** -.00000485*** -.00000485*** -.00000486*** -.00000487*** -.00000486*** -.00000486*** 
 
CONSTANT .0249556*** .024754*** .0247058*** .0251914*** .0247206*** .0252052*** .0248409*** .0247126*** 
 
 
INTER2PRE .0026683* -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
INTER2GC -  -.0146201 -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
INTER2INFL -  -  .0007989 -  -  -  -  - 
 
INTER2INST -  -  -  -.0239171 -  -  -  - 
 
INTER2INV -  -  -  -  -.0046387 -  -  - 
 
INTER2HC -  -  -  -  -  -.00000249 -  - 
 
INTER2OPEN -  -  -  -  -  -  -.0037755 - 
 
INTER2TT -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -.0450959 
 
N  487  487  487  487  487  487  487  487 
 
R2  .3577  .3580  .3574  .3589  .3574  .3579  .3575  .3583 
 
F  26.51*** 26.55*** 26.47*** 26.65*** 26.47*** 26.53*** 26.48*** 26.58*** 
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Table 6 
 
Regression results, with interaction terms 
 
Variable   Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT*  .0127393 .0050774 
PCGDP***  -3.35e-06 7.20e-07 
INVGDP***  .1279158 .0182063 
PREMIUM**  -0.0020454 0.0007124 
GCGDP***  -0.0552653 0.0162408 
TRADESHOCK*** 0.075532 0.02177 
OPENNESS*** . 0.0122968 0.0032949 
HUMCAP*  1.10e-06 5.03e-07 
INSTABILITY*  -0.0135358 0.0065842 
INFLATION***  -0.0217672 0.0052823 
INTER1INV**  -0.0522926 0.0200165 
INTER2PREM*  0.0022576 0.011876 
F: 23.74*** 
R2: 0.3472 
N: 503 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the ten-percent level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the one-percent level. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 0.1-percent level. 
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Table 7 
Policy losses, 1990-1995 
 
PREMIUM   GOV. CONSUMPTION  INFLATION    TOTAL (including OPENNESS) 
 
1.  Sudan -.018012 Bangladesh -.0288824 D.R. Congo -.0881611  Zambia  -.0528751 
2.  Iraq  -.0157129 Congo  -.0264371 Brazil  -.0602273  Bangladesh -.0412315 
3.  Zambia -.014283 Seychelles -.0153241 Nicaragua -.0192669  Congo  -.0406117 
4.  Iran  -.0139607 Zambia  -.014896 Suriname -.0176086  Nicaragua -.0333811 
5.  Rwanda -.0123634 Gambia  -.0145059 Zambia  -.016545  Malawi  -.0333646 
6.  Afghanistan -.0116902 Malawi  -.0129835 Peru  -.0130841  Nigeria  -.0278548 
7.  Burundi -.0101165 India  -.011956 Turkey  -.0127837  Algeria  -.0235717 
8.  Tanzania -.0100075 Egypt  -.011014 Uruguay  -.0098094  Zimbabwe -.023245 
9.  Syria  -.0097141 Cameroon -.0090921 Mozambique -.0076283  Egypt  -.0216799 
10.  Haiti -.0094832 Guyana  -.008683 Congo  -.0075382  India  -.0206507 
 
Countries with maximum losses from lack of openness (.0071508): Iraq, Congo, Senegal, Myanmar, Chad, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Cote D’Ivoire, Papua New 
Guinea, Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Zambia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Burundi, D.R. Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Iran, India, Pakistan 
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Table 8 
 
Correlation of components of malgovernance, 1990-95 
 
Full sample 
 
  PREMIUM INFLATION OPENNESS 
 
 
INFLATION 0.3666     
 
OPENNESS -0.5728  -0.1457 
 
GCGDP  0.2806  0.0586  -0.4522 
 
Negative per capita growth 
 
  PREMIUM INFLATION OPENNESS 
 
INFLATION 0.6109 
 
OPENNESS -0.5329  -0.2466 
 
GCGDP  0.2447    0.4819    -0.3147 
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Table 9 
 
Losses from terms of trade shocks, 1990-1995 
 
1.  Yemen  -.0128522 
2.  Trinidad and Tobago -.0089113 
3.  Syria   -.0077276 
4.  Comoros  -.00705 
5.  Nigeria  -.0063427 
6.  Mozambique  -.0063083 
7.  Angola  -.0048 
8.  Guinea-Bissau -.0046544 
9.  Guinea  -.0042862 
10.  Gabon  -.0034569 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Policy losses, entire sample period 
 
PREMIUM   GOV. CONSUMPTION  INFLATION    TOTAL (including OPENNESS) 
 
1.  D.R. Congo -.0122629 Bangladesh -.0196369 Argentina -.0198353  Zambia  -.031146 
2.  Tanzania -.0106803 Zambia  -.0152793 D.R. Congo -.0181369  Uganda  -.0259174 
3.  Ethiopia -.00973  Guyana  -.0127932 Peru  -.0138244  Argentina -.0245935 
4.  Poland -.0092194 Cent. Afr. Rep. -.0111499 Nicaragua -.0103602  India  -.0223809 
5.  Sudan -.0090739 India  -.0107055 Uruguay  -.0091125  Nigeria  -.0211238 
6.  Malawi -.0088354 Panama  -.0083839 Bolivia  -.0082233  Ghana  -.0171532 
7.  Zambia -.0084939 Malawi  -.0083092 Chile  -.0070161  Uruguay  -.0152309 
8.  Rwanda -.0078205 Togo  -.007987 Uganda  -.0056179  Chile  -.0151685 
9.  Bangladesh -.0075058 Nigeria  -.0064362 Indonesia -.0055085  Algeria  -.0136571 
10.  Nepal -.0074826 Cameroon -.0055758 Israel  -.0052582  Cent. Afr. Rep. -.0136571 
11.  Ghana -.0074071 Sri Lanka -.0045808 Turkey  -.004231  Sri Lanka -.0123975 
12.  Hungary -.0073461 Egypt  -.0044096 Ghana  -.0034466  Kenya  -.011222 
13.  Algeria -.0072049 Kenya  -.0041309 Zambia  -.0031905  Bolivia  -.0105097 
14.  Nigeria -.0069961 Costa Rica -.0038931 Sierra Leone -.0030815  Pakistan  -.0102893 
15.  Burundi -.0067901 Uganda  -.0032936 Mexico  -.0023561  Burundi  -.010203 
16.  Iraq  -.006649 Chile  -.0030952 Iceland  -.0017781  Costa Rica -.0095969 
17.  Iran  -.0061675 Bolivia  -.0028805 Mozambique -.0014082  Togo  -.0091251 
18.  Pakistan -.0056121 Burkina Faso -.0027812 Ecuador  -.0011974  Paraguay -.0089928 
19.  Sri Lanka -.0054044 Ghana  -.0025502 Colombia -.0010542  Dom. Republic -.0088553 
20.  Zimbabwe -.0051847 Philippines -.0010618 Suriname -.0010542  Cameroon -.0082892 
21.  Syria -.0051125 Algeria  -.0008865 Nigeria  -.0005407  Israel  -.0079563 
22.  Chile -.0050871 Ecuador  -.000756 Tanzania -.000205  Philippines -.0071179 
23.  El Salvador -.0050643 Sweden  -.0007465 Jamaica  -.0001461  Turkey  -.0066875 
24.  Dom. Rep. -.0045662 Mauritius -.0006513 Venezuela .0001497  Tunisia  -.005536 
25.  Argentina -.0043291 Nicaragua -.000635 Costa Rica .0004618  Indonesia -.0051368 
26.  Yugoslavia -.0042262 Honduras -.0004637 Paraguay .000541   Iran  -.0050051 
27.  Kenya -.0041586 Denmark -.0004298 Iran  .0005945  Colombia -.0043421 
28.  Botswana -.0041427 Madagascar -.0003237 Malawi  .0006956  Burkina Faso -.0038689 
29.  Brazil -.0041158 Paraguay -.0002802 Dom. Republic .0007439  Ecuador  -.0028875 
30.  Paraguay -.0039924 Tunisia  -.0001063 Portugal  .0008047  Honduras -.0017107 
31.  Jamaica -.0037313 Pakistan  .0005149 Greece  .0008985  Venezuela -.0005113 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Policy losses, entire sample period 
 
PREMIUM   GOV. CONSUMPTION  INFLATION    TOTAL (including OPENNESS) 
 
32.  Lesotho -.0037192 Cyprus  .0008778 Philippines .0010388  Jamaica  -.0001289 
33.  Ecuador -.0034773 Jordan  .0011225 Madagascar .0010563  Syria  .0002564 
34.  Turkey -.0033647 Uruguay  .0013182 Korea  .0010737  Mexico  .0006368 
35.  Indonesia -.0033255 Portugal  .0013263 Syria  .0011797  New Zealand .0080982 
36.  Tunisia -.0033255 Zimbabwe .0013794 Kenya  .0011949  Korea  .0085963 
37.  Israel -.0029391 U.K.  .0015656 Congo  .0011979  Cyprus  .0092031 
38.  Bolivia -.0028373 Indonesia .0017776 Myanmar .001245   Jordan  .0094892 
39.  Costa Rica -.0027941 Peru  .0018034 Zimbabwe .0012955  Portugal  .0097122 
40.  Colombia -.0024809 Burundi  .0018116 El Salvador .0012966  Greece  .0116128 
41.  South Africa -.002416 Thailand .0019013 South Africa .0013178  Malaysia .0153013 
42.  Philippines -.0022117 Austria  .002063  Egypt  .0013549  Sweden  .0153017 
43.  Korea -.0019039 Dom. Rep. .0021201 Bangladesh .0013698  Denmark .0156429 
44.  Afghanistan -.0018385 Ireland  .0025293 Lesotho  .0014509  Thailand .0158535 
45.  Morocco -.001818 New Zealand .0026407 Swaziland .0015276  Ireland  .0159626 
46.  Uruguay -.0015518 Finland  .0029071 Spain  .0015803  U.K.  .0173859 
47.  Cyprus -.0006754 Colombia .0029425 Algeria  .0015851  Austria  .0181553 
48.  Greece -.0003031 Malaysia .0031164 Nepal  .0016521  Spain  .0184582 
49.  Venezuela -.0002153 France  .0036493 Gambia  .0016656  Finland  .0188725 
50.  Jordan -.0001181 Jamaica  .0037186 Guatemala .0016681  Italy  .0196585 
51.  Portugal .0015044 Norway  .0037281 Haiti  .0017638  France  .0198412 
52.  Congo .0017881 Israel  .0039904 Trin. & Tobago .0017714  Norway  .0198748 
53.  Senegal .0017881 Italy  .0041861 Italy  .0017944  Australia .0198962 
54.  Cote D’Ivoire.0017881 Spain  .0042052 Botswana .0018046  Belgium  .0223842 
55.  Benin .0017963 Venezuela .0048155 Sri Lanka .0018474  Canada  .022394 
56.  Mexico .0019827 Greece  .0049405 Burundi  .0019263  Netherlands .0233248 
57.  Cameroon .0023342 Mexico  .0051376 India  .001957   U.S.  .0243614 
58.  Honduras .0025404 Argentina .0054557 Pakistan  .0019588  Switzerland .0245606 
59.  Guatemala .002625  Australia .005684  Mauritius .0019674 
60.  Malaysia .002854  Canada  .0059382 New Zealand .0019838 
61.  Haiti .0030167 Trin. & Tobago .00607  Honduras .001984 
62.  Niger .0033434 Turkey  .0061693 Ireland  .002023 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Policy losses, entire sample period 
 
PREMIUM   GOV. CONSUMPTION  INFLATION    TOTAL (including OPENNESS) 
 
63.  Cen. Afr. Rep..0033473 Belgium  .0064832 Mauritania .0020695 
64.  Burkina Faso .0033473 Netherlands .0066627 Hungary  .0020851 
65.  Togo .0033473 Korea  .006751  Cameroon .0021032 
66.  Chad .0040476 Iran  .0077188 U.K.  .0021423 
67.  Thailand .0051632 Switzerland .0077392 Barbados .0022061 
68.  Oman .0055031 U.S.  .0078275 Cote D’Ivoire .002217 
69.  Spain .006596  Singapore .0085003 Mali  .0022776 
70.  Hong Kong .006785  Syria  .0090726 Finland  .0022875 
71.  Belgium .0069053     Gabon  .0022902 
72.  Japan .0069903     Hong Kong .002292 
73.  Austria .0070068     Ethiopia  .0023104 
74.        Sweden  .0023703 
75.        Fiji  .0023898 
76.        Denmark .0023948 
77.        Jordan  .002408 
78.        Australia .0024239 
79.        Cent. Afr. Rep. .0024316 
80.        Norway  .0024687 
81.        Senegal  .0024851 
82.        France  .0025139 
83.        Morocco .002527 
84.        Kuwait  .0025408 
85.        Tunisia  .0026902 
86.        Papua N.G. .0026171 
87.        Chad  .0026583 
88.        Togo  .0026656 
89.        Benin  .0026889 
90.        Taiwan  .0027102 
91.        Thailand .0027121 
92.        China  .0027155 
93.        Burkina Faso .0027159 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Policy losses, entire sample period 
 
PREMIUM   GOV. CONSUMPTION  INFLATION    TOTAL (including OPENNESS) 
 
94.        Niger  .0027542 
95.        Canada  .0027779 
96.        Japan  .0028114 
97.        U.S.  .002856 
98.        Belgium  .0029188 
99.        Cyprus  .0029239 
100.        Netherlands .0029843 
101.        Austria  .0030086 
102.        Luxemburg .0030094 
103.        Saudi Arabia .003046 
104.        Switzerland .0031435 
105.        W. Germany .0032239 
106.        Malta  .0032274 
107.        Malaysia .003254 
108.        Singapore .0032775 
109.        Panama  .0033705 
 
 
Note: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, U.K., U.S. and W. Germany had equal 
estimated bonus from PREMIUM, .0076011. 
 
Note: OPENNESS 
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Table 11 
 
Terms of trade losses, 1960-1995 
(ttloss or losstt?) 
1.  Ghana    -.0027388 
2.  Sri Lanka  -.0021854 
3.  Nicaragua  -.0019535 
4.  Malawi  -.0018178 
5.  India   -.0017208 
6.  Mozambique  -.0016464 
7.  Uganda  -.0015207 
8.  D.R. Congo  -.0015109 
9.  Japan  -.0015015 
10.  Mauritania  -.0013217 
11.  Chile  -.0012711 
12.  Zambia  -.001258 
13.  Madagascar  -.0012034 
14.  Cote D’Ivoire -.0011165 
15.  South Africa  -.0011071 
16.  Pakistan  -.0010054 
17.  Niger  -.0009912 
18.  Brazil  -.000983 
19.  Taiwan  -.0008842 
20.  Cameroon  -.0008494 
21.  Thailand  -.0008333 
22.  Sierra Leone  -.0008267 
23.  Peru  -.0008257 
24.  Egypt  -.0007956 
25.  Mauritius  -.0007643 
26.  Papua New Guinea -.000747 
27.  Argentina  -.0006731 
28.  Bangladesh  -.0006689 
29.  Cent. Afr. Rep. -.0006579 
30.  Italy  -.0005702 
31.  Togo  -.0005658 
32.  U.S.  -.0005317 
33.  Benin  -.0005181 
34.  Australia  -.0005132 
35.  Costa Rica  -.0004919 
36.  Philippines  -.0004432 
37.  Ethiopia  -.0003988 
38.  Jamaica  -.0003966 
39.  Dom. Republic -.000368 
40.  Gambia  -.0003083 
41.  Trin. & Tobago -.0002961 
42.  Canada  -.0002779 
43.  Guatemala  -.0002383 
44.  Ireland  -.000201 
45.  Belgium  -.0001941 
46.  Malaysia  -.0001529 
47.  Spain  -.0001515 
48.  Netherlands  -.0001025 
49.  Denmark  -.0000928 
50.  Sweden  -.0000881 
51.  Senegal  -.0000331 
52.  Austria  -.0000255 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
53.  Chad  .0000687 
54.  Mali  .0000996 
55.  Israel  .0000997 
56.  Uruguay  .0001097 
57.  El Salvador  .000115 
58.  U.K.  .0001285 
59.  Norway  .0001343 
60.  Korea  .0001864 
61.  Greece  .000215 
62.  France  .000231 
63.  Colombia  .0002367 
64.  Finland  .0003122 
65.  Jordan  .0003866 
66.  Kenya  .000468 
67.  Morocco  .0004759 
68.  New Zealand .0005161 
69.  Indonesia  .0007275 
70.  Paraguay  .0007363 
71.  Switzerland  .0007987 
72.  Algeria  .0008011 
73.  Honduras  .0008217 
74.  Panama  .0008687 
75.  Mexico  .0008838 
76.  Angola  .0009083 
77.  Nigeria  .0009897 
78.  Rwanda  .0010205 
79.  Venezuela  .001264 
80.  Iceland  .0013467 
81.  Ecuador  .0014354 
82.  Tunisia  .0016663 
83.  Burkina Faso .0017934 
84.  Syria  .0018756 
85.  Congo  .0020704 
86.  Iran   .0022896 
87.  Gabon  .0023834 
88.  Bolivia  .0028734     
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Table 12 
 
Correlation of components of malgovernance, 1960-1995 [redo 90-5 with components, not losses] 
 
Full sample 
 
  PREMIUM INFLATION OPENNESS 
 
 
INFLATION 0.1677  -   
 
OPENNESS -0.2268  -0.1651 
 
GCGDP  0.0790  0.0161  -0.3064  
 
Negative per capita growth 
 
  PREMIUM INFLATION OPENNESS 
 
INFLATION 0.1779 
 
OPENNESS -0.1327  -0.1115 
 
GCGDP  0.0106    -0.0686   -0.1844 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 13 
 
Successful reform: Value of LOSSTOT in each five-year interval 
 
   1965-70  1970-75  1975-80  1980-85  1985-90  1990-95  1990-5  Change 
1. Indonesia -.030431 -.0309901 -.000881 .009903  .0092  .006098  .00601  .036441 
2. Korea  -.007256 -.000848 .010531  .012981  .016904  .017369  .023761  .031017 
3. Chile  -.018092 -.018434 -.049918 -.016838 .003626  -.000316 .007058  .02515 
4. Israel  -.010399 -.002959 -.002688 -.011932 -.027665 -.00025  .013466  .023865 
5. Cent. Afr. Rep. -.032787 -.029149 -.034761 -.025594 -.021843 -.009438 -.011672 .021115 
6. Tunisia  -.009538 -.009543 -.006078 -.003984 -.004327 -.001425 .00941  .018948 
7. Ireland  .006428  .017759  .017748  .017691  .018437  .022174  .024768  .01834 
8. New Zealand .00741  .007028  .006858  .004588  .005584  .014794  .023693  .016283 
9. Uganda  -.017973 -.01579  -.018534 -.029676 -.023176 -.025364 -.002997 .014976 
10. Philippines -.007432 -.004313 -.009758 -.008946 -.010773 -.002747 .007412  .014844 
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Table 14 
 
Gradual and radical reform 
 
1965 
Taiwan  Government, Premium 
Brazil  Government, Inflation 
Venezuela Government, Premium, Openness 
1970 
 Indonesia Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Egypt  Government, Premium 
 Senegal  Government, Premium 
 Korea  Government, Premium, Openness 
1975 
 Chile  Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Cameroon Premium 
 Indonesia Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Sri Lanka Government, Premium, Openness 
1980 
 Chile  Government, Openness 
 Mauritania Government, Premium 
1985 
 Bolivia  Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Israel  Premium, Inflation,  Openness 
 Ghana  Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Costa Rica Government, Inflation, Openness 
 Cent. Afr. Rep. Government, Inflation 
1990 
 Argentina Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Poland  Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Uganda  Inflation, Openness 
 Mexico  Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Venezuela Premium, Openness 
 Paraguay Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Bulgaria  Government, Premium, Inflation 
 Israel  Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Turkey  Government, Premium, Openness 
 Ghana  Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Uruguay  Government, Inflation, Openness 
 Tunisia  Premium, Inflation,  Openness 
 Gambia  Government, Premium, Inflation, Openness 
 Philippines Government, Premium, Openness 
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Fig. 1 - Components of lost growth
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